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### 1

#### Obama has held off new sanctions but needs PC to sustain Congressional support for ongoing negotiation commitments

Parsi 11 – 20 – 13 (Trita Parsi is founder and president of the National Iranian American Council and an expert on US-Iranian relations, “Negotiations with Iran show promise, but true test comes later,” <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/iran-us-negotiationsgenevanuclearprogram.html>, CMR)

However, it is also clear that the real hurdles to an enduring deal will not be encountered now, but after the first agreement has been concluded. This is partly because Washington's ability to give concessions has not been truly tested yet. The **misinformation spread by** Israeli cabinet ministers and **opponents of** President Barack **Obama in** the U.S. **Congress notwithstanding, most of concessions in the first phase of the deal currently being negotiated in Geneva will be provided by Tehran**. **In return, the U**nited **S**tates and European Union **are offering** very **little**. **The sanctions relief is minimal and carefully avoids congressional approval**. **Obama has spent** a lot of political capital in the past two weeks simply **to convince Congress not to adopt new sanctions**. If a deal is reached this week in Geneva, **Obama will be faced with** **the** much taller order **of getting Congress to actually roll back existing sanctions**.

#### That’s key to preventing talks failure

Mousavian 10/18, Seyed Hossein “The road to finalizing a nuclear deal with Iran”, 2013 <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/18/iran-nuclear-talksgenevauraniumenrichment.html>, CMR

These ongoing talks have the potential to become a historic moment for the U.S., Iran and the international community. However, to ensure their progress, President Obama must do two things. First, he must resist pressure from hawkish members of Congress, Israel and lobbying groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and United Against Nuclear Iran. And second, he must include significant sanctions relief in the final agreement with Iran. While Iran and the international community are ready for a final deal, the question remains whether Obama has the will to buck the hawkish pro-Israel lobby and the political capital to end sanctions.

#### **The plan destroys Obama’s agenda and the link turns the case**

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Negotiations failure turns multilat and causes global nuclear war

Press TV 11/13 Cites Jeff Steinberg, a Senior Editor at the Executive Intelligence Review, “Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail”, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/>, CMR

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war. ¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. ¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." ¶ Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. ¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake." ¶ "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not rolling them back," Psaki added.

### 2

#### China’s Latin American influence is increasing – trends prove

Martinez 13 (Guillermo I. Martinez, Columnist Sun Sentinel, “America losing influence throughout Latin America,” http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523\_1\_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri)

Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power.

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 3

#### Text: The United States federal government should unconditionally lift its economic sanctions on the Republic of Cuba.

#### The net benefit is neoliberalism – the CP is purely negative state action – normalizing trade relations involves trade talks under WTO jurisdiction which forces Cuba to comply with international trade norms.

#### Positive state action is a manifestation of hemispheric integration – forces neoliberalism on Cuba

**Phillips 2005**

(Nicola, Sheffield political economy professor, “U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas”, Latin American Politics and Society, 47.4, December, Wiley)

The process of hemispheric integration represents a key dimension of the neoliberal project, both in the Americas and in the wider global political economy. It represents a device by which this global project is further embedded in the region and the region is further embedded in the globalizing world economy, reflecting “the triumph of economic lib- eralism, of faith in export-led growth and of belief in the centrality of the private sector to development processes” (Payne 1996, 106). Hemi- spheric regionalism thus represents a specific strategy on the part of its primary agents-various governments and business interests-to “lock in” a political economy and a mode of social organization that are ide- ologically and strategically hospitable to the rules of the neoliberal game. Of these agents, the U.S. government has been the principal driv- ing force, and the exercise of its hegemonic power since the early 1970s has been molded systematically to the purpose of disseminating the twin values of neoliberalism and democracy. The hemispheric project thus constitutes not only an attempt further to reinforce the parameters of a neoliberal (and democratic) political economy in the Americas, but also to consolidate the foundations of U.S. hegemony itself in the global and regional contexts.

#### That reduces people to bare-life – culminates in extinction

Santos 3 (Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra‑conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### Agriculture

**US is modeling now**

**Viljoen and Bohn 12** (André , an architect and principal lecturer in architecture at the University of Brighton, and Katrin, an architect and joined the faculty in September 2001 where she teaches architecture at the University of Brighton“Scarcity and Abundance: Urban Agriculture in Cuba and the US”, 7 JUL 2012, Wiley)

Ten years on from our ﬁrst observations in Cuba, the country’s organopónicos remain, and elsewhere, not least in the US, urban agriculture experiments are testing out different scenarios. Baltimore, Milwaukee and Chicago are among a vanguard of North American cities actively encouraging urban agriculture. Recent discussions with planners and activists in the US conﬁrm the observation that practice is outstripping policy, as individuals take forward urban agriculture projects at a range of scales and with diverse aims. At the time of writing, one could say (if we grossly simplify the situation) that in Europe wider urban strategies, broadly in line with the CPUL city concept, are being developed, while in the US a complete spectrum of pioneering individual projects are underway aiming to encompass and interlock desires for social gain, empowerment, community building, environmental improvement and commercial viability. The range of new projects is staggering, and if Cuba’s urban agriculture revealed spatial possibilities and the effectiveness of systematic support systems, the US is testing different spatial, technical and ﬁ nancial models of production. In New York, for example, alongside a long-established radical and thriving community garden movement, new rooftop farms are appearing. Predominantly established by media-savvy young graduates and activists, these are pioneering projects whose participants – through sheer hard work – are prototyping new, commercially viable food-producing or educational enterprises. Across the US, hydroponics and soil-based cultivation are being utilised for rooftop and covered (glasshouse) cultivation with much work occurring in Milwaukee, led by Will Allen’s organisation Growing Power. Many new organisations, like Sweetwater Organics, prototyping large-scale urban aquaponic systems, can be traced back to Growing Power.

#### Cuban ag is being modeled now – Cuban farmers are travelling to other countries to spread it 0 sufficient infrastructure now

Clausen, 7 **–** teaches sociology and environmental studies at Fort Lewis College in Durango, CO. Her research in environmental sociology focuses on fisheries and marine degradation**.** (Rebecca, “Healing the Rift” Monthly Review, May, <http://monthlyreview.org/2007/05/01/healing-the-rift>)

The rift in social metabolism of food production under capitalism is aggravated by private ownership of land, the strict division between mental and manual labor, and the unjust distribution of the fruits of labor. Cuba’s model of agriculture systematically transcends these alienating conditions, reconnecting farmers to the land through cooperative production, participatory decision making, and diversified distribution. Can this vision for ecological sustainability and social equality extend beyond the island of Cuba?

Cuban farmers are traveling to Latin American and Caribbean nations to assist farmers in setting up similar types of food production systems. Indeed, Cuba’s fastest growing export is currently ideas. Cuba hosts many visiting farmers and agricultural technicians from throughout the Americas and elsewhere. Cuban agronomists are currently teaching agroecological farming methods to Haitian farmers, as well as assisting Venezuela with their burgeoning urban agriculture movement.

#### There aren’t enough imports to meet demand, which creates the market for Cuban organics

Cloos, 4/19 – The Pulitzer Center (Kassondra, “Sustainable Farming In Cuba Ideal Job In An Isolated Country”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/19/sustainable-farming-in-cuba\_n\_3112088.html) //SP

The farmers pour in after sunrise and leave before sunset. The workday is one to two hours shorter than a typical day for a government employee, depending on the season, and the pay is higher—much higher.

Organiponico Vivero Alamar (OVA) is an organic, sustainable farm just outside Havana, where its private business status allows farmers the freedom to make smart economic moves and attract the best and brightest farmers, scientists and researchers to improve daily operations. Visitors come from all over the world to see the farm that countless bloggers have praised for its high wages (compared to government jobs in Cuba) and other benefits. Workers can take home fresh, organic produce like plantains, guavas, lettuce, tomatoes, taro, sweet potatoes, pineapples, mango and more, which OVA president and founder Miguel Salcines says contributes to maintaining a healthier populace. There are also on-site barber and manicure services, interest-free loans, daily meals cooked fresh from food the farmers have worked hard to produce, profit shares based on seniority and a strong community feeling that visitors find admirable and even surprising. The classic American image of the streets of Cuba is a fairly accurate one—old cars and crumbling buildings. Havana is a city so locked in time it can be startling to see a citizen whip out a cell phone. One government tour guide spoke extensively to the high demand and low supply of food. The government provides a small amount of food for each family based on the health needs of individuals, she said—meaning only some families receive milk while other families receive meat. It is difficult to earn enough to supplement the basic food allotment: The tour guide is paid only $13 a month because the government assumes she will earn tips. Even with tips, she says it’s not enough to make ends meet. She has taken on a second job as a freelance English teacher. Yet, unlike tour guides, OVA farmers make a decent living. And if Cuba can make farming profitable, why can’t other countries? There is no simple answer. The explanation starts with the realization that Cubans were forced into agricultural innovation by a very real need to feed a mass number of starving people, according to Elon University agro-ecology professor Steve Moore. “There was a great set of circumstances that spawned that,” he said. “When Russia pulled out, they had no more cheap oil and cheap resources, so they had to think of something real quick.” More food was needed, with fewer resources to produce it—leading to farming practices that avoided costs like excessive energy use and fertilizers. In the United States, which has long struggled to keep its growers afloat, democracy and the freedoms afforded to private enterprise have not yet come to terms with better farming practices for various reasons. The most notable one is price, Moore said. He has studied farming extensively and says it’s easier and, in the short term, cheaper, to throw fertilizer and fossil fuels at farming woes than it is to sit down and figure out how to do things better. OVA sells its wares at a farm-front marketplace six days a week. As an urban farm, it’s widely accessible to Cubans who don’t own cars, and most of its fresh produce is sold out by the end of the day. Cuba imports a great deal of food, but there’s a gap between imports and local production that makes food scarce and waste a social sin. Moore, who was a long-time farmer before leaving his field to become a professor, understands this from experience. He and his wife sacrificed a great deal to keep their business going. Even if he would have preferred to keep food in his nearby community and cut down on transportation costs by selling food to local markets, it was significantly more profitable to travel great distances from their farm in Pennsylvania to sell larger amounts of produce at urban supermarket prices. “We would sell about an hour and a half to two hours away and drive a truck down to the DC-Baltimore area,” he said, “because we would get at least twice the price for it than we would in our own town.” Even though many Americans claim food costs are high, Moore maintains they’re not. Americans aren’t willing to spend a high proportion of their disposable income on food when it’s dirt cheap to import out-of-season crops from other countries, and it can be near impossible for local farmers to compete with these prices. No one knows this better than Moore and his wife, who for more than a decade could not afford health insurance. The vast majority of other farmers in the United States face similar financial troubles. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that less than 1 percent of Americans call themselves farmers. Fewer than one in four farms makes more than $50,000 a year in gross revenue. In 2008, the Census Bureau found that net income related to farming activities was less than $10,000 per year. Most farm families need to supplement that with wages earned off the farm. OVA, though, provides a community-style workplace with a good salary and benefits. Although wages are still meager when compared with salaries in more developed countries, they are two to three times higher than Cuba's government paychecks, which can be as little as the equivalent of $13 a month. On top of their salaries, farm workers also get a percentage of profits that increase with seniority, usually adding up to the equivalent of a few extra dollars every other week. Jose Ramon Rey, who works to fatten the bulls OVA uses for natural fertilizer and sells to the tourist industry, said he wanted to work at the cooperative not just because he comes from a farm family, but also because of the benefits it provides. “Economically, I feel better because I earn a good salary,” he said. “In general, I cover all my family’s expenses with the money I earn here.” Ramon Rey has worked at OVA for eight years and it’s his only job, an increasingly uncommon phenomenon in Cuba. The food grown at OVA stays within the country, and is diverse and completely sustainable. Everything is recycled and organic, unlike other farming practices around the world that rely on the ability to force crops to grow when nature would have it another way. As Moore says, farmers in many other parts of the world do not wait out inopportune weather or push back a growing season. Instead they spread tons of fertilizers to stay on schedule. It’s cheap. And so is fossil fuel.

### Transition

#### US military power unmatched and resilient

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”

#### Normalized US-Cuban ties coming under Diaz-Canel.

Gott ‘13

Richard Gott is a writer and historian. He worked for many years at the Guardian as a leader-writer, foreign correspondent and as the features editor. He is the author of Cuba: A New History, published by Yale University Press – Guardian – Feb 25th – http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul

The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. So it is with the history of Cuba, which has long moved forward at a barely observable speed. The announcement by Raúl Castro, aged 81, that he will retire in 2018 (after two terms in office), and that his likely successor as eventual president will be Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermúdez (now appointed vice-president), aged 52, suddenly catapults the half-century-old revolutionary process into new and unfamiliar waters.

By 2018, Fidel Castro, aged 86, long described as an ageing revolutionary, will likely be dead; so too will most likely be Cuba's revolutionary ally in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Barack Obama will also have left the scene, the last of nearly a dozen US presidents that the Cuban revolution has outlived. Cuba will then move forward at its customary glacial pace without any Castros at the helm and without any members of the revolutionary generation of 1959 that will by then have guided the country for nearly 60 years (the retiring vice-president, the revolutionary veteran José Ramón Ventura Machado, was born in 1930 and is 30 years older than his replacement). Four questions immediately pose themselves. What is the nature and character of the new leader? What will be his impact on the internal Cuban scene? What will be the future of the all-important economic relationship with Venezuela, which provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban developmental aid (in terms of doctors, security advisers and sports instructors)? And how will a new Cuban leadership affect relations with the United States which has maintained an economic blockade of the island for the past half century? For supporters of the Cuban revolution, there are reasons to give optimistic answers to all four questions. Diaz-Canel may have an unfortunate physical resemblance to a Soviet-style Bulgarian apparatchik of yesteryear but he has proved to be a competent administrator and a genial party chief in two provinces, Villa Clara and Holguín. Plucked from relative obscurity to be the youngest ever member of the politburo, he has been minister of higher education and has recently taken on important foreign roles. With a background as a university professor and an enthusiastic cyclist, he has also served in the armed forces, a significant and necessary detail in the biography of a future leader. As a protégé of Raúl Castro, Diaz-Canel has been a supporter of the current programme to introduce market forces into some aspects of the economy and there is no reason to suppose that this would not continue. The list of reforms is impressive: the introduction of co-operatives outside the agricultural area; the creation of private farms and businesses; the sale of private houses and cars; and the availability of visas for foreign travel. For many people these reforms have not gone far enough, but the new mood of optimism in Cuba is palpable. Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed throughout the continent, not just with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the most intriguing question now concerns Cuba's future relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget what the quarrel was all about. The road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling blocks has been the continued existence of a Castro in power. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the Castro brothers has a continuing role. By 2018, this will no longer be relevant. There seems little doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba would be able to forge a new and beneficial relationship with the US.

Turn – Castro Cred

A. Economic reforms are coming now in Cuba – causes long term stability-----GREEN

Sweig and Rockefeller, 2013 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, and Michael Bustamante “Cuba After Communism The Economic Reforms That Are Transforming the Island” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>)

#### Small-time diaspora capital may prove easier to regulate and rely on than funds from multinational corporations driven strictly by profits. Under the repatriation provisions of the island's new migration law, some Cubans may even retire to the island with their pensions and savings after decades of working abroad. Yet opening the doors for more young citizens to leave could prove risky for a quickly aging, low-birthrate society that has been suffering from a brain drain for some time. Besides, along with remittance dollars, Cuba urgently needs both medium and large investors. Ultimately, only larger outlays can help fix Cuba's most fundamental economic problem: its depleted productive base. Castro appears to recognize that attracting foreign investment, decentralizing the government, and further expanding the private sector are the only ways to tackle this long-term predicament. The government is unlikely to proceed with anything but caution, however. Officials are wary of rocking the domestic political boat, and citizens and party leaders alike recoil from the prospect of more radical shock therapy. Rising public protests in China and Vietnam against inequality and rampant corruption have only reinforced the Cuban government's preference for gradualism. Striking an adequate balance will be no easy task. In late 2012, Havana legalized the creation of transportation cooperatives -- private, profit-sharing entities owned and manage by their members -- to fix bottlenecks in agricultural distribution. Meanwhile, 100 state enterprises are now running their finances completely autonomously as part of a yearlong pilot program. The government is also reportedly considering ways to offer a wider array of potential foreign partners more advantageous terms for joint ventures. But the Communist Party is working through numerous contradictions -- recognizing a place for market economics, challenging old biases against entrepreneurs, and hinting at decentralizing the budget while incongruously insisting, in the words of its official 2011 guidelines, that "central planning, and not the market, will take precedence."¶ EASING OFF THE DADDY STATE¶ Curtailing the state's economic role while preserving political continuity requires threading a delicate ideological needle. Although the government expects to continue providing Cubans with key social services, such as health care and education, party leaders have reprimanded the island's citizens for otherwise depending too heavily on what one prominent official a few years ago called the "daddy state." In the eyes of many Cubans, this is deeply ironic. Cuba's revolutionary founders, who built up a paternalistic state in the service of equality, are now calling for that state's partial dismantlement. What's more, most Cubans already need to resort to the black market or assistance from family abroad to acquire many daily necessities.

B. The plan creates a political whirlwind that kills reforms and causes instability-----GREEN

Hernandez, 2012 (Cuba’s Leading Social Sciences professor and researcher at the University of Havana and the High Institute of International Relations; Director of U.S. studies at the Centro de Estudios sobre America; and a Senior Research Fellow at the Instituto cubano de Investigacion Cultural “Juan Marinello” in Havana. “Debating U.S-Cuban Relations”)

#### As far as costs are concerned, although many Cubans favor detente and appreciate its economic benefits, they also remain worried about its political and ideological effects. These could affect the national consensus in a period during which social and political cohesion is of strategic value. A wave of U.S. capital flooding a Cuban economy that has not completed its reform process could have some counter­productive effects. The U.S. government could try to steer the flow of capital to favor its political goals. Various groups— Cuban-American organizations, NGOs, other institutions, and the U.S. ideological apparatuses—would have more avenues to influence the Cuban domestic context.¶ Given the fundamental asymmetry of power between the two sides, once the words "let's play cards" are spoken, the "hands" will be quite unequal. If the United States were to reverse its policy and begin to "make concessions" in return for "equivalent Cuban responses," the government of the Island would find itself in an unprecedented tactical arid strategic situation. This won't be one more round but, rather, a whole new rule book. In other words, with any increased chance of an alternative form of relations, the risk profile of quid pro quo increases. For Cuba, to take on this challenge could mean to adopt a conservative line and play defensively only; or it could mean to invent a new proactive strategy for the game. Within such a new approach, the ability to realign the available resources of political power would be decisive. Classically, the sources of political power in a situation of asymmetric confrontation lie in alliances and in consensus. This issue is complex both for Cuba and for the United States. Besides allied powers, affinities within the international system, and sympathetic ideological currents, the dynamic of rapprochement not only highlights and energizes the role of "rivals" or "opponents" but also that of" allies" within the "enemy's" own camp. The identities of such allies of the United States in the region, in Europe, and also on the Island are obvious. The allies of Cuba are also well known, paradoxically including novel ones such as many business executives and military officials who had classically been the "tips of the imperialist spear."¶ In a scenario of re-encounter between the United States and Cuba, both governments face the challenge of overcoming old dogmas, dealing with changes in the respective political consensus of each, trying to reshape those and restructure their alliances. The main weakness Cuba must overcome is not its lesser military or physical power but its siege mentality. That of the United States is not its ineptitude in dealing effectively with "communist regimes" but its sense of superpower omnipotence.

The plan causes media access and revolutionist ideals that loosens Raul’s control

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

Relations with the United States are at a historical nadir, but improving them is not a priority, Alarcón said. In fact, Cuba would be challenged to come up with a good strategy if the next U.S. administration were inclined to improve relations. Raúl should carefully weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations with the Americans or respond to a new administration’s decision to permit increased travel to Cuba. Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access to the U.S. market from a normal bilateral relationship, the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. More critical to Cuba than improved relations with the United States is for it to strengthen its relations with the major developing nations, especially Russia, Mexico, and Brazil Speaking for all those present, Machado Ventura thanked Raúl for his confidence in them and assured him of their absolute loyalty. Raúl could be confident because it was highly unlikely that domestic or international conditions would threaten his hold on power, but in any case¶ he should seek to establish his credibility as a leader on his own terms. One way to do so would be to reinforce the fusion of leadership at the highest levels of the Council of State, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Cuban Communist Party. As for the international community, Cuba could count on Venezuelan oil subsidies in the short term, and in the longer term would have access to substantial new energy reserves from offshore oil and gas and the production of sugarcane ethanol. Raúl should concentrate his international efforts on promoting and diversifying Cuba’s economic relationships. Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population, which could be worsened if the new U.S. administration decides to loosen restrictions on travel and remittances. More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency.. Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations Raúl has been skillful in allowing some social reforms; additional reforms, however, should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.

That increase in communication and access makes status squo opposition movements effective --- achieves Cuban Instability

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

Participants considered the wide range of actors that constitute the “established opposition” within Cuba today and debated whether these diverse groups could coalesce around a common denominator or vision. Despite the signing of several declarations of unity among leading opposition activists, for the most part the three traditional political fronts— Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats— being shaped by the most prominent dissident groups continue to pursue their own uncoordinated and often conflicting visions of change. 5 The question of leadership remains a problem, with most opposition groups known for their individual leaders rather than the movements they represent. Such personality-driven activism has had the tendency, many believe, to keep the opposition fractured. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion, the most well-known being the Varela Project— started in 1998 by Oswaldo Payá of the Christian Liberation Movement and named after Felix Varela, a Cuban religious leader— and its continuation, the Todos Cubanos (All Cubans) program. The Varela Project relied upon Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, which provides for citizens to introduce legislation by petition containing at least 10,000 signatures. The principles of the Varela petition, demanding the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, were seen as the first steps to create the necessary space for all Cubans to be able to freely participate in economic and political life on the island. The petition was an unprecedented example of successful political organizing and was presented to the National Assembly with a total of 25,404 signatures in 2002 and 2003. The Cuban legislature rejected the petition, and the Assembly’s Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee responded with its own counterinitiative: to amend the Cuban constitution to make the socialist nature of the Cuban state permanent. The government claimed that its own petition met with 99 percent voter approval. To further crush the Varela Project and the dissident movement at large, beginning on March 18, 2003, the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried, and jailed seventy-five civil society leaders, including independent journalists, librarians, and trade unionists. In spite of the continued existence of mobilizations such as the Varela Project, participants disagreed in their assessment of the dissident movement’s level of impact within Cuba today. Most agreed that because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media and their constant vilification in the state press, few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative. Some participants felt that international support may be the only thread propping the movement up. Others saw the opposition as a weak but nonetheless substantive movement with significant roots. The key issue confronting participants was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant in light of changing political and economic dynamics. In the end, a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.

#### The plan can’t solve the Cuban economy – Castro pockets it, but it links to appeasement

Suchlicki ‘13 (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

#### Ending the embargo kills US credibility and causes Latin American democratic backsliding, a China-Russia-Cuba alliance, and aggressive Cuban Lashout

**Brookes 9** Peter Brookes4/16/2009 (heritage council, Senior Fellow, Brookes is serving his third term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He previously served in the administration of President George W. Bush as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs. In this post, he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances in Asia, Brookes was a professional staff member with the House International Relations Committee. He also served with the CIA and the State Department at the United Nations. In the private sector, he worked in the defense and intelligence industries.

A decorated Navy veteran, Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Causes bio and cyber terror

**Westerman 6**

Toby Westerman (Editor and publisher of International News Analysis, the independent journal of contemporary world political, social, and economic developments, and its Internet presence) 2006 International News Analysis Today “Cyber attack aimed at the US?”, http://www.traditioninaction.org/HotTopics/i46htWesterman\_Cyberattack.html

A dying Cuban dictator Fidel Castro could launch a devastating cyber-terror attack as a last and final blow against his decades-old enemy -the U.S. - according to a Cuban-born computer engineer in an exclusive interview with International News Analysis. Cuba and its terror allies are intent on destroying the United States, and Castro's precarious physical state may be a key factor in timing a terror attack against the United States, according to Manuel Cereijo, a Cuban-born expert in computer engineering, and head of a consulting group to industry and government. The very technology that has insured U.S. world leadership in commercial and military endeavors could also make American society vulnerable to a sophisticated cyber attack, Cereijo stated. An initial bio-terror attack would be used to set the stage for social chaos in the U.S., Cereijo warned. As deadly pathogens begin to take their toll in human lives, a follow-up cyber attack could paralyze America's capacity to respond. Phone and other forms of communications would begin to break down. The effect of the biological attack would be multiplied many times by the fear imposed upon the population by the inability to communicate with others. Police, emergency personnel, and hospitals would all be operating without coordination or knowledge of the actions of one another. Panic could ensue among the targeted population as the sense of isolation increased. America's response to such an attack "would be tremendous," Cereijo said, but worth the price to Castro and his terrorist allies, if it meant serious damage to America. Castro will be 80-years-old this August, and has been in power since 1959. He is rumored to have Parkinson's disease, and may be suffering from the beginning effects of Alzheimer's. Castro's implacable hatred against the U.S. political and economic system has not changed over his nearly 50-year reign, and he has even advocated Nuremberg-type war crimes trials for capitalists. During the 1962 missile crisis, Castro urged the Soviet Union to launch an atomic strike against the U.S., despite the destruction it would mean for Cuba. Today, Castro remains a potentially reckless figure capable of risking catastrophic consequences for his island nation, Cereijo told International News Analysis. The Communist Cuban regime is committed to terror. Havana has close ties with virtually every important terror group and terror-supporting nation in the world, including the missile-ready regime of North Korea and the nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian and Cuban governments have already vowed to bring the United States "to its knees."

**Cyber-terror causes extinction**

**Fritz, 9** --- researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University [Jason, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf>]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually **cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another,** thus **provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power**. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to **compromise the** extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send **nuclear launch approval** to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, **multi-layered attacks** could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and **cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own,** without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

### Multilat

#### Gridlock makes multilat impossible – can’t solve global problems

Held 13, David Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” <http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation>, CMR

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.¶ Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems---indeed it is---but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

#### US will inevitably reject multilat – no chance the plan spillsover

Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister and former senior vice president of the World Bank, is a member of the Spanish Council of State, “The U.S. suffers from strategic blindness”, 11-7-13, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2013/Nov-07/237017-the-us-suffers-from-strategic-blindness.ashx#ixzz2kNblgrQo>, CMR

That is all the more true given that the nature of such problems has also changed. America, like the rest of us, is vulnerable to climate change, pandemics and terrorism – challenges that require coordinated global solutions. For the U.S., however, the utility of multilateralism is purely situational. Above all, multilateralism is never preferable to a “good” bilateral solution – a view that has reinforced behavior that undermines, rather than strengthens, the capacity for effective international action. Indeed, always ready to negotiate treaties but rarely prepared to sign – and even less likely to ratify – them, the U.S. remains absent from such key global agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its inspired creativity and support in building formal institutions like the United Nations and World Bank has given way to a predilection for weak, informal and ad hoc groupings, such as the various G-somethings and “coalitions of the willing.” Establishing effective multilateralism requires an emphasis on rules and institutions that facilitate coordination. The recent decision by the U.S. to sign the Arms Trade Treaty could be a good start – if only Congress could marshal the bipartisan support needed to ratify it. But scattered moves in the right direction will not suffice. What is really needed is a change in vision and mentality – a shift from viewing multilateralism as a tactic to embracing it as a strategic imperative.

#### Multilat fails and can’t be fixed---bilateral engagement fills-in

Gowan 8/19---associate director for Crisis Management and Peace Operations at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations

“Diplomatic Fallout: G-20, U.N. Summits Likely to Highlight, Not Resolve, Global Tensions”, 2013, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13173/diplomatic-fallout-g-20-u-n-summits-likely-to-highlight-not-resolve-global-tensions>, CMR

Believers in international cooperation need to be optimists. It takes faith and patience to endure the endless conferences, committees and communiques that make up multilateral diplomacy. But **even upbeat advocates of global governance are liable to feel gloomy** about the prospects for two major meetings scheduled for next month. The first is the annual G-20 summit, to be hosted by Russia in St. Petersburg on Sept. 5-6. The second is the gathering of world leaders for the opening of the new session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York beginning Sept. 24. Both **events** are more likely to **highlight** the limits of multilateralism than its benefits, and the G-20 summit could prove to be an especially excruciating affair.¶ The world’s press will descend on St. Petersburg on high alert for signs of tensions between the U.S. and Russia. U.S. President Barack Obama has canceled bilateral talks with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, citing the latter’s decision to offer asylum to intelligence leaker Edward Snowden. Obama announced that the G-20 meeting was too important to miss, but he has been deeply critical of Russia’s handling of the Syrian conflict and its new anti-gay legislation. Putin, whose lack of rapport with Obama is now notorious, may not be able to refrain from trying to embarrass his guest. Putin could raise the Snowden affair or, even more cruelly, compare Washington’s recent equivocations over the Egyptian crisis to its hard line on Syria.¶ Obama will at least take comfort from the fact that he won’t have to see the Russian leader again in New York. Putin is giving the opening of the General Assembly a miss. This is not especially surprising, as he also failed to attend last year. Perhaps more tellingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping will be absent too, passing on his first opportunity to address the U.N. since he replaced Hu Jintao. This may signal the low priority that Beijing places on U.N. affairs (by contrast, Xi is planning to make it to St. Petersburg). But other significant leaders are staying away from the General Assembly as well.¶ Angela Merkel can’t attend because of Germany’s elections. Britain’s David Cameron is sending his deputy, Nick Clegg. With Cameron, Putin and Xi elsewhere, Obama and French President Francois Hollande will be the only leaders of permanent members of the Security Council to be present. Hollande, who has a good story to tell about France’s fight for Mali, will not stay long.¶ There will still be some intriguing diplomatic moments for those leaders who do get to New York. There is particular interest in whether Iran’s new president, Hasan Rouhani, will attend and if he makes any major gestures towards detente with the West over Syria or nuclear issues. U.N. officials may try to cobble together a meeting between the Syrian government and rebels in the margins of the meeting, as it has so far proved impossible to bring the two sides together for much-heralded peace talks in Geneva.¶ Obama could still be the star of the show. His fellow leaders will be intrigued to see if he makes any significant statements on climate change, an issue he has emphasized domestically since his re-election. The president and his secretary of state, John Kerry, will probably try to make as much capital as possible out of the latter’s success in revitalizing the Middle East peace process. But the Egyptian crisis has already set back Obama’s reputation for diplomatic competence, and Snowden’s revelations about U.S. spying make it rather tricky for the president to talk idealistically about global cooperation.¶ None of this may matter very much. Even if the St. Petersburg summit is chilly, it may run more smoothly than the last two top-level G-20 conclaves in Cannes, France, and Los Cabos, Mexico. The Cannes summit was overwhelmed by urgent diplomatic maneuvers over the eurozone crisis, and the Mexican meeting was also dominated by the European Union’s problems. With the euro enjoying a period of relative stability, there should be less drama this time. Officials who have participated in G-20 meetings report that the main discussions are stilted and formulaic, and this year may be no exception.¶ The fact that the U.N. General Assembly is unlikely to achieve very much is hardly a shock. **Obama has given good speeches** at the U.N. in the past, **but** none **have had** lasting resonance. In the past, leaders such as Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez spiced up the meeting with bizarre or fiery rhetoric. But Ahmadinejad is no longer in office, and Gadhafi and Chavez are no longer on this earth. The U.N. will be a duller place in their absence, but as I have recently noted, lower-level and less colorful officials have made progress over the last year on issues such as the Arms Trade Treaty. **The U.N. tends to advance through** such gradualist **successes**.¶ Yet **the fact that** the **supposed high points in the multilateral calendar may** well **be flops signals something significant** about the state of international relations. In 2009, when Obama first addressed the General Assembly and hosted a G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, these top-level meetings were useful opportunities to show that the world was pulling together in the face of the financial crisis. But as the economy has stabilized, **security issues**—ranging **from Syria to** disputes in **the South China Sea—have created a new sense of** international polarization, especially among the West, Russia and China.¶ **Multilateral meetings**, whether under the G-20 or the U.N., might be good mechanisms for reducing such polarization in theory. Yet they **are** losing salience. **The** most important **summit** to have taken place so far this year **was** arguably **the** bilateral meeting **between Obama and Xi** in June. **In an age of polarization, such one-to-one contacts will carry** far more weight **than multilateral circuses**.

# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:50)

#### The DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### 1) Export markets – aff causes anti-Chinese Asian bandwagoning – that collapses Chinese export markets and prevents them from achieving growth targets – that causes instability, repression, and migration – escalates to global collapse, loose nukes, and lashout.

#### 2) Framing – outweighs on magnitude – triggers global escalation and retaliation – prefer this – you can only die once and Chinese instability makes every global problem worse – tanks relations – solves and turns every impact in the 1AC

Cohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only the collateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility to shape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has been elusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence. Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging in policymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, must cease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area of genuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of any response to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that collaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiency and emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energy exploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace and stability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As two nuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want to minimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in the waters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global security institutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN Security Council require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly, crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Korean peninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the two countries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and China could do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially build networks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on the issue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperation along the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner. 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as an observer and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbing narcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To be sure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington and Beijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large powers with vastly different histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to have challenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressing issues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather than public recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trust and respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impede Sino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa, will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual and global interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperation in other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additional mechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact, many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems is the premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power, as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, the fundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on Smart Power noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates a major investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chinese and American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should be no expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the American and Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation. U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.

### 2NC – Turns multilat

#### It turns multilat – US strongarming in Latin America forces China to back down and pushes them out of the region – that makes them less likely to cooperate. Increasing regional US cred disrupts China’s multilateral efforts at expansion and promotes US-led expansionism.

### 2NC – Turns Cuban econ (reforms)

#### Turns and solves Cuban transition – Chinese investment ensures reforms

Hearn 12 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba,” http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496)

Sino-Cuban cooperation is indeed driven by a political strategy, but it is focused less on undermining the United States than on the longterm (and less newsworthy) goal of upgrading and coordinating Cuba’s industrial capacities. Although Chinese “assistance” to Cuba is managed through governmental channels, it has been accompanied by advice from Beijing about the benefits of incorporating a greater degree of private initiative into the existing state-led system. Under the leadership of Raúl Castro since 2008, the Cuban government has begun to heed this advice as it seeks to open the island’s economy in a controlled manner. The next section examines recent advances in Sino-Cuban cooperation, including bilateral efforts to plan the latter’s industrial evolution and implement market reforms. These developments suggest that the Cuban government is distancing itself from Fidel Castro’s 50-year-long rejection of capitalism, and moreover, that China is committed to guiding the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation toward reconciliation with international conventions.

### 2NC – AT: Chinese transition bad (Cuba)

#### Fast reforms solve – key to short and long term growth

Hearn 12 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American Studies Association “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba,” <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496>)

State cooperation with China has helped Cuba to establish the basic infrastructure it needs for economic growth. The challenge now facing the island is to employ this platform to support private initiative and harness the productive potentials of the market. As Robert B. Reich famously wrote three decades ago, “Economies are like bicycles. The faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided” (Reich 1982). The Chinese government adopted this strategy of gradual liberalisation at home in the early 1980s, and has repeatedly advocated it to Cuban officials ever since Fidel Castro’s 1995 meeting with Premier Li Peng in Beijing (Cheng 2007; Jiang 2009). After 15 years of hearing their advice, Cuba’s reformers – led by Raúl Castro – are now listening. Cuba’s sixth Communist Party Congress, which took place in April 2011, showed a growing acceptance of the market as a catalyst for national development. The Economic and Social Policy Guidelines approved by the congress declared that ownership of private property, long considered antithetical to socialism, is now considered acceptable on the condition that it is not “concentrated” (República de Cuba 2011: 5, 11). The critical concern has therefore become how the state might leverage its considerable institutional capacities to optimise and guide economic performance. Critics argue that unlike China, Cuba’s commitment to “updating the socialist system” constitutes a justification for maintaining the 50year-old status quo, and that in light of the regime’s longevity, “nothing much will change” (Azel 2011). Others view the 2011 reforms as “a significant realignment of the paternalistic relationship that has existed between the state and its citizenry since the revolutionary period began in 1959” (Laverty 2011: 4). Even Cuba’s long-time critic, Freedom House, has found that “the opening of a private sector, while still limited, is driving genuine change in Cuba” (Moreno and Calingaert 2011: 25). Especially significant, argues Cuba analyst Arturo Lopez-Levy, is the loosening of restrictions on the sale of real estate and automobiles: There is much political continuity in Raúl Castro’s government, but the recent announcement that Cubans will be able to sell and buy houses and their used carsrepresents an important change. These are visible economic reforms with direct impacts on Cuban lives. The marketisation of these assets unleashes Cuban entrepreneurial spirit and might increase the remittances received from relatives and friends abroad (Lopez-Levy 2011a). Effective implementation of the 2011 reforms will require a phased and coordinated approach, and in this regard China can provide some useful lessons. Among the insights Cuba has derived from China – with varying degrees of attentiveness – are the gradual sequencing of reforms under the management of a state-appointed reform commission (Laverty 2011: 65; Lopez-Levy 2011b: 9, 2011c: 43-44), the adaptation of socialist principles to national conditions (Mao et al. 2011: 199), the military management of commercial activities (Klepak 2010), the attraction of investment from emigrants (Ratliff 2004: 21-22), and the testing of liberalisation in target territories prior to wider implementation (Heilmann 2008).

### 2NC – Cuban biotech

#### Chinese influence solves Cuban biotech which is their internal link to disease

McGiffert et al 9 – Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the US Department of State (Carola, “Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States”, CSIS Smart Power Initiative, March 2009, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)//KG>

Although China's investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as catalysts for a stronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has opened significant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology expertise-and a presence in the Westem Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States. Cuba's strength in biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nation’s health, scientific, and medical research and delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators of any country in the developing world. Its infant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States and several other large industrialized nations. Cuba has made considerable advances in biotechnology including the development of the world's first vaccine for meningitis B, has developed a pesticide for dengue- carrying mosquitoes, and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis B vaccines in the region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and, as an example, is advancing its TheraCIM hR3 anti-cancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany During the past two decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According to Cuba's National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2001 was roughly $2.1 billion. Though hard to measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cuban biotechnology industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech pharmaceutical companies have emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in earnest in 2004 when Chinese and Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnological cooperation during Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was to amplify cooperation and deepen the economic and commercial ties between the two countries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity Biotech Pharmaceutical, set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research and pharmaceuticals to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since 2006, China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber PharmaceuticaIs, which produces interferon and other compounds; and, most recently, Beijng Neurotechnology Limited, which will develop, produce, and commercialize neurotechnological products. China's recent economic growth and increasing global power have cast a new light on this relationship. Beijing's interest in Cuba has produced more frequent high-level meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and numerous exchanges in the areas of science, technology and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban biotech- nology industry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is expected to continue to grow.

### 2NC – Turns embargo

#### DA solves the case – Chinese reforms create political cover for the US to lift the embargo in the future – treat it as a status quo CP

Nash 5/24 (Paul Nash, 5/24/13, Diplomatic Courier, HOW THE CHINESE ARE HELPING TO TRANSFORM CUBA, AGAIN, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/192-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-transform-cuba-again, HSA)

Since the medical emergency that forced Fidel to cede power to a provisional government headed by his brother Raúl in 2006, China, like the United States, has grown hopeful that a new chapter may be about to open in Cuba’s history. For its part, Beijing would like to see a strategic economic alliance that will bolster its trading position in the Caribbean and Latin America, one that Beijing’s policymakers feel should be “comprehensive and cooperative.”¶ Former Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Cuba in November 2008 while touring Latin America. Meeting with Fidel and Raúl, he proclaimed, “History has proved that [China and Cuba] are worthy of the name of fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers.” Raúl bounded onto stage before the Chinese delegation and sang “The East is Red,” a popular song during Mao’s Cultural Revolution evoking sentiments of world revolution. In faltering Mandarin he crooned: “The East is red, the sun has risen; China has produced a Mao Zedong. He creates fortune for the people; he’s the saviour of them all!”¶ Whether Raúl mistakenly thought this was the best way to pander to Hu, who had just deferred a large trade loan for ten years and donated $10 million toward hospital improvements, or was simply trying to pacify an ailing brother who still holds fast to an ideology that has failed Cuba, it was an awkward moment for the Chinese. Since China embarked on Deng Xiaoping’s program of market opening and integration with world capitalism, its Communist Party has struggled to distance itself from its Maoist past.¶ Hu invited Raúl to China several months later to give him a first-hand look at China’s idea of modern “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and to sign agreements that would strengthen economic and trade relations.¶ China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is China’s largest trading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing wants to help Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own experience over the past three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic consumption. To this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light industry, and tourism.¶ Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its ailing sugar industry by abolishing the sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar companies that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in 2012 to modernize harvesting equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar annually to China, more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption.¶ China’s interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbean’s natural resources and those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijing’s viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will conduct business with left-leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban partnership may represent a lost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cuba’s economy reform such that it, like Vietnam’s, no longer justifies the continuation of a decades-old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cuba’s economy is “dominated or controlled by international communism.”

### 2NC – CCP collapse (0:30)

#### **Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse**

Lewis 8 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war

Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html>)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### 2NC – China war (lashout) (0:15)

#### Incursion into the Chinese SOI causes lashout – perceived as provocation

Lettieri 5. [Michael, research associate, "Bush goes to Beijing, China goes to Latin America" Council on Hemispheric Affairs -- November 14 -- www.coha.org/bush-goes-to-beijing-china-goes-to-latin-america/]

Indeed the PRC has powerful motivations for such courtships: as China has industrialized its strategic ties to Latin America have grown. Demonstrably, the region has assumed an increasing importance as a source for vital agricultural and mineral resources. Beijing aggressively seeks growth and expansion, and despite the altruistic and fraternal tones taken in its trade agreements, it is far from an eleemosynary gesture. Since it is possible that China’s neocolonial investment strategy could result in crises similar to those which traditionally have involved comparable U.S. interests in the past, it is possible that China could also emulate Washington’s provocative practices to protect its newfound engagements.¶ As Beijing moves through the early stages of establishing close working arrangements with Latin American militaries, China is perhaps readying itself to ensure that its economic and strategic interests are being safeguarded in the event that regional developments threaten the significant funds it is now beginning to invest in such countries as Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina. In examining these ties, it helps to recall earlier U.S. strategies that led to various categories of intervention in such countries as Cuba, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama, where an important military factor eventually came into play. This is not to say that China will necessarily exactly emulate past U.S. behavior, but that it may unwittingly find itself heading down that road.

### 2NC – Containment (short)

#### Encroaching on China’s sphere of influence leads nuclear conflagration

Eland 05– Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute and Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Ivan, “Coexisting with a Rising China,” 4/11, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)//VP>

Although China is an autocratic state, it still has legitimate security interests. The United States would be smart to show some empathy with those concerns. In recent years, as the United States has become alarmed at China’s expanded military spending, the Chinese have also become alarmed at large increases in the U.S. defense budget and U.S. attacks on the sovereign nations of Serbia and Iraq. Many Chinese see the threat of an expanding U.S. empire that aims at encircling China and preventing its legitimate rise to great power status. To lessen such perceptions and reduce the chance of conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations, the United States should retract its forward military and alliance posture in Asia, including repudiating any implied commitment to defend Taiwan. With large bodies of water as moats and the most formidable nuclear arsenal in the world, the United States hardly needs a security perimeter that stretches across the entire Pacific Ocean to protect it from China. If the United States continues to maintain an outdated Cold War-style empire, it is bound to come into needless conflict with other powers, especially China. Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany, the United States should take a page from another chapter in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration.

### 2NC – Cuba

#### Influence increasing – recent visits

Prensa Latina 10/25 (Prensa Latina 10/25/13, China and Cuba Value as Excellent Their Level of Relations, http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=1989211&Itemid=1, HSA)

Beijing, Oct 25 (Prensa Latina) Senior officials from China and Cuba ratified today the excellent level of relations between the two countries and the mutual intention of working for the deepening of these ties at Government, Communist parties, and peoples level.¶ These criteria are contained in an official note on a meeting in Beijing between the secretary of the State Council of the Republic of Cuba, Homero Acosta Alvarez and the State Councilor Yang Jing, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.¶ The Chinese leader moved greetings of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Kegiang to the Cuban President Raul Castro, according to an official ¶ Homero Acosta makes a working visit to China as part of the exchange of mutual experiences of socialist construction in their respective countries.¶ This time the exchange is focused on legal and institutional issues.¶ The delegation led by the secretary of the State Council of Cuba will stay in China until October 31, with a program including meetings and visits to places of interest, such as that made to the southern province of Guangdong.

#### The Sino-Cuban relationship is unique – China is establishing itself in the Carribean to push the US out

Simon 9/4 (Francois Simon, 9/4/13, The Dragon’s Tail, <http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/2013/04/09/cuba-china-communist-understanding/>, HSA)

The Caribbean’s largest island and China have natural political ties. The fall of the Soviet block in the 90s, in addition to the US embargo, has lead to a business boom in between both countries, especially in the last decade. China is now Cuba’s second trade partner (after Venezuela) and its share is rising as traditional European and Mexican partners decline. The dragon is evermore becoming an alternative to the US and its allies.¶ Political ties have always been strong, as Cuba was the first Latin american nation to recognize China and establish diplomatic relations in 1960. However both countries started to interact and intertwine over a century before that. After England’s abolition of slavery in 1833, many southern Chinese labour workers migrated to Cuba, from 1850 to 1880, on 8 year contracts to work in the plantations. Although work conditions were deplorable (prompting the Chinese government to intervene), the Chinese community flourished giving birth to “el barrio Chino” in La Havana, Latin America’s largest Chinatown. By 1959 and Castro’s revolution, 50000 Chinese lived and worked there, mainly owning small businesses such as restaurants and shops. Castro’s mass nationalisation and expropriation naturally put an end to this way of life and pushed most of the Cuban Chinese to migrate abroad. Nowadays the Chinatown is very small and has very few links with China. International relations also went sour in the 70s when Cuba sided with the Soviets in its ideological confrontation with China. It is only after the collapse of the USSR that a new Sino-cuban relationship took off, the Cuban Chinese even benefiting from small-scale private rights (small restaurants and groceries).¶ Indeed, China has launched many bilateral deals in the past fifteen years in cultural, medical and technical fields and has taken on the Soviet’s legacy as Cuba’s main manufacturer. Bilateral trade has risen from $440 million in 2001 to $1,9 billion in 2010 (official Chinese figures), mainly due to Chinese exports. While China imports nickel, sugar, tabaco and biotechnology, Cuba mostly imports electronics and construction material. China has also repeatedly offered interest free loans and credit lines to Cuba as it opens its markets. These Chinese funds are in many cases used to buy Chinese products: in 2001, a $200 million loan was used to modernise telecommunication and $150 million to buy Chinese television sets. However the particularity of Sino-cuban trade is that it includes two communist state-controlled partners. This benefits Chinese goods directly as they are coordinated and distributed nation-wide by the Cuban government. For example China has recently exported many low consumption electronics (refrigerators, washing machines, televisions and air conditioners) which were directly put on the government and domestic markets with virtually no competition. In exchange of these official state channels for Chinese goods many joint ventures include Cuban based factories and technological transfer. The first was in 1997 with a bicycle factory using Chinese capital and expertise, followed by electric fan factories, slippers, etc. This gives China great control over its trade with Cuba, from the production to the distribution of goods and even funding.¶ China has also heavily invested in raw material, mainly nickel and oil. Cuba is one of the world’s important nickel producers and the metal, used in the production of stainless steel and other corrosion-resistant alloys, is its leading export. China on the other hand, which consumes 40% of the world production of nickel wishes to secure some of these reserves. In 2004, China decided to invest $500 million in a nickel processing facility of Las Camariocas which is jointly owned by Cubaníquel (51%) and Minmetals Corporation (49% and Chinese). Likewise, although Cuba is a net oil importer (notably from Venezuela), China has chosen to invest in Cuba’s oil infrastructure. Since 2008, China has been exploring offshore oil in the Pinar del Rio region with Sinopec and Cuba’s oil company CUPET. The Scarabeo 9 $750 million deep-sea drilling platform recently built in China for Saipem (subsidiary of Italian energy company ENI) is also operating in the same sector. CNPC, the other major Chinese oil company also runs explorations in the gulf of Mexico (Camarioca Norte 100 exploration well) and has launched a joint venture in 2011 with Cuven Petrol SA (Venezuelo-Cuban company) to invest in the Cienfuegos refinery. China’s investment is not, as in a most cases, a way to secure oil resources in Cuba, but an opportunity to establish itself as an alternative to Western powers and gain experience in offshore drilling and refining.¶ In the past 10 years China has been modernising Cuba’s Soviet-era infrastructure, from transport to IT and communications. HuaWei and ZTE, two Chinese telecommunication equipment companies, are omnipresent in bringing up to date the Cuban internet infrastructure. HuaWei for example has been updating the very slow inland internet system and China helped build Venezuela’s underwater ALBA broadband cable to Cuba in 2011. A number of deals were made in between both countries to modernise all types of transport. From 2006 to 2008, 100 Chinese locomotives and 1000 Yutong buses were delivered. Indeed, after the end of the Soviet era, bus spare parts stopped being produced and Cuban bus mobility was reduced to 20-30%. Today though, bus transport has been restored and Cuban buses are sometimes even referred to as “Yutong” by the population. In 2011, The China Harbor Engineering Company also started work on the Santiago port project. This is important for China as it thus gains the capacity to use Cuba as a pivot for its trade in Central and South America.¶ China has also invested in Cuba’s innovative medical field. In 2008, president Hu invested $70 million in health infrastructure to upgrade Cuban hospitals. Many joint ventures have also been created in Cuba or in China such as an ophthalmology hospital in Hefei. One major success in the domain is BPL (Biotech Pharmaceutical Co Ltd), established in 2000. The company is dedicated to monoclonal antibodies and vaccine research, and produced the first approved genetically engineered monoclonal antibody in 2007. In 2011, Cuba’s MIC (Molecular Immunology Center) announced that the anti-lung cancer vaccine CimaVax EGF made by BPL would be conducting trials in China, thereby sealing the partnership between both countries in biotechnology.¶ Both countries have a different vision of communism. China has achieved growth while embracing open market and is now investing and imprinting Chinese-style market orientated reforms in Cuba (especially since Raul Castro has taken charge). Thus it has both a political and economical objective in Cuba: it is establishing itself as an alternative to the US (and showing this to the other Latin-American countries) and is securing an outpost in the Caribbean for trade. China-Cuba relationship is not based on socialist solidarity but on business.¶

### 2NC – AT: Relations high (0:45)

#### Relations not high:

#### 1) Controversies – Snowden and NSA spying on Rouseff and Nieto tanks US regional cred and causes counter-balancing – economic ties alone are insufficient to cause alliance shifts.

#### 2) Framing – US inaction is sufficient to generate uniqueness – China’s filling to end dependence on the US – it’s only a matter of time. Increased effective cooperation causes US agenda setting which crowds them out.

#### 3) It’s about action, not rhetoric

Padgett 5/27

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME “Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America” WLRN – South Florida 5/27/13 <http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america>]

There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas.¶ “No it’s not,” he says. “President Obama’s trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show America’s interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America.”¶ Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere “matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.”

#### 4) Security focus – ensures anti-American sentiment

Fossett 5/28

(Katelyn, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to Economy,” Interpress Service News, [www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/](http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/))

Development’s Achilles heel¶ Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime, many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom, with more robust social programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.¶ Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, calls Latin America “far behind” in developing policies that might leverage inclusive growth.¶ “There is not a sense of shared responsibility … when your social policy is remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted,” she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs “a widespread recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government … [and] institutions.”¶ In a telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns.¶ “There is a growing consensus in the development community that sustainable growth can’t and will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under control,” she told IPS.¶ The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the “Achilles’ heel of development” in Latin America.¶ Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico.¶ “The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement.¶ “As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico.”¶ In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that “[t]he human rights crisis will not improve until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”¶ Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations turns to economics, there is no broad agreement on how exactly a shift toward trade relations will strengthen the “economic competitiveness” of both countries.¶ “Part of the challenge is that we have this term, but we have a laundry list of issues that could fit into that term,” the Mexico Institute’s Chris Wilson said.¶ “What we still don’t have is a coherent agenda or a way in which the leadership from the top level can engage the public or business community or civil society … and create something more [meaningful],” he told IPS.

#### 5) The plan’s special, even if some cooperation is inevitable

Stratfor 13

[Stratfor Global Intelligence. “ Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and Obama's Visit” 5/2/13 <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit> ]

Domestic political factors will determine the success of the pending overhauls. But the labor reform could improve bilateral commerce and investment with the United States, as would a successful liberalization of the country's energy sector in the coming years. Mexico is already the United States' third-largest trading partner, and economic coordination between the two countries has become a routine matter at the ministerial level, but there is still a need to ease bureaucratic trade and investment barriers.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:40)

#### Aff crowds out China:

#### 1) New hemispheric tone – causes bandwagoning to the US which disrupts Chinese trade blocs and creates an uncertain investment environment.

#### 2) Perception – shared history and culture mean countries will switch sides if we show interest – proximity supercharges the link

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### 3) Empirics – Columbia pushed China out after we funded their war on FARC – affecting ideology is key – spills over to regional market access

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – Link (generic zero-sum)

#### Relations are zero-sum:

#### 1) Financing locus – US proximity means we step in

Menendez 13 (Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China US Focus, “The Counterbalance in America’s Backyard”, web)

From the perspective of Latin America’s foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcome economic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superior economic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away from the current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing, trade and development. China’s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise China’s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from America’s national security apparatus.

# 1NR

**1Counter-interp—1 CP/1K**

**Advocacy Construction—contradictory worlds force defense of the middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—key to neg flex, prevents ideological extremism and solves advocacy skills**

**Argument Innovation—debaters are risk-averse—a back-up strategy allows introduction of new positions—solves breadth and research skills**

**Strategic Thinking—forces smart coverage decisions—solves argument choice and info processing**

**[If Dispo] Logic—squo’s always an option—prerequisite to education**

**Defense—**

**Skew inevitable—DAs and T—perms skew worse**

**Fairness impossible—resource differentials—no impact—people don’t quit**

**2NR solves depth and advocacy skills.**

**High Threshold—theory has a 5-to-1 time trade-off—they have the last speech—unless we make debate impossible, vote neg**

**Judge is a referee—Potential abuse not a voter**

### Trans

#### Don’t esc – 2 reasons

**Hotspots don’t escalate – the term existential threat has been overused – yes actors can face a bunch of threats but they have not isolated a clear bar in the 2ac about what constitutes escalation – they need to isolate specific risks to specific countries to access escalation – they clearly haven’t done that – that’s drenzer**

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

#### US military power unmatched and resilient

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

They say dip – not responsive to military power and limited esc for spec countries

### 2NC No Extinction—Short

**Diseases won’t cause extinction—that’s Posner—err neg**

**A) Empirics—we have survived every disease in the last 200,000 years and none have come close**

**B) Natural selection—diseases that pose too big of a threat burn out.**

**C) Their evidence is alarmism—doesn’t assume co-evolution**

**Achenbach 3** (Joel, Washington Post Staff Writer, "Our Friend, the Plague," Nov, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0311/resources\_who.html, AD: 6/30/09) jl

shimWhenever a new disease appears somewhere on our planet, experts invariably pop up on TV with grave summations of the problem, usually along the lines of, "We're in a war against the microbes"—pause for dramatic effect —"and the microbes are winning." War, however, is a ridiculously overused metaphor and probably should be bombed back to the Stone Age. Paul Ewald, a biologist at the University of Louisville, advocates a different approach to lethal microbes. Forget trying to obliterate them, he says, and focus instead on how they co-evolve with humans. Make them mutate in the right direction. Get the powers of evolution on our side. Disease organisms can, in fact, become less virulent over time. When it was first recognized in Europe around 1495, syphilis killed its human hosts within months. The quick progression of the disease—from infection to death—limited the ability of syphilis to spread. So a new form evolved, one that gave carriers years to infect others. For the same reason, the common cold has become less dangerous. Milder strains of the virus—spread by people out and about, touching things, and shaking hands—have an evolutionary advantage over more debilitating strains. You can't spread a cold very easily if you're incapable of rolling out of bed. This process has already weakened all but one virulent strain of malaria: Plasmodium falciparum succeeds in part because bedridden victims of the disease are more vulnerable to mosquitoes that carry and transmit the parasite. To mitigate malaria, the secret is to improve housing conditions. If people put screens on doors and windows, and use bed nets, it creates an evolutionary incentive for Plasmodium falciparum to become milder and self-limiting. Immobilized people protected by nets and screens can't easily spread the parasite, so evolution would favor forms that let infected people walk around and get bitten by mosquitoes. There are also a few high-tech tricks for nudging microbes in the right evolutionary direction. One company, called MedImmune, has created a flu vaccine using a modified influenza virus that thrives at 77°F instead of 98.6°F, the normal human body temperature. The vaccine can be sprayed in a person's nose, where the virus survives in the cool nasal passages but not in the hot lungs or elsewhere in the body. The immune system produces antibodies that make the person better prepared for most normal, nasty influenza bugs. Maybe someday we'll barely notice when we get colonized by disease organisms. We'll have co-opted them. They'll be like in-laws, a little annoying but tolerable. If a friend sees us sniffling, we'll just say, Oh, it's nothing—just a touch of plague.

Ev assumes their diseases

### Grad

#### DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### Status squo reforms resolve structural barriers to US-Cuban cooperation -- plan overwhelms those changes and empowers pro-US groups within Cuba --- that destabilizes the Cuban regimes and causes democratic backsliding, refugee flows and the emergence of militant opposition groups – that’s Gorrell

#### Caribbean region is uniquely vulnerable to acquisition of bioweapons – lack of state oversight makes it incredibly easy for terrorists to steal medical information and products – they use those to attack the US – that’s Bryan

#### The causes extinction – no impact defense because it doesn’t account for the innovations in biotech that make extinction possible – they’re a depiction of old weapons but our Sandberg evidence is future predictive, which should be preferred because of the changing nature of technology

Turns the case – cuba is an outlet for imperialism – any allowance of US intervention commodifies reform and makes their impacts inevitable

Treto, 2012 (Carlos, Professor and Senior researcher at the University of Havana’s Centro de Estudios Hemisfericos y de Estados Unidos and a member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences. Former Cuban ambassador the EU and to Belgium and Luxembourg and a former Cuban Minister to Ethiopia. Visiting scholar at universities in the US, Mexico and Europe; visiting professor at Beloit College, the University of Basque Country, and the University of Winnipeg. Debating U.S.- Cuban Relations Chp: “Cuba’s National Security vis-à-vis the United States”)

#### Cuba occupies a special place in the history of American imperialism. It has served as something of a laboratory for the development of the methods by which the United States has pursued the creation of a global empire. In the aggregate, the means used by the United States in Cuba constitute a microcosm of the American imperial experience: armed intervention and military occupation; nation building and constitution writing; capital penetration and cultural saturation; the installation of puppet regimes, the formation of clientele political classes, and the organization of proxy armies; the imposition of binding treaties; the establishment of a permanent military base; economic assistance— or not—and diplomatic recognition—or not—as circumstances warranted. And after 1959, trade sanctions, political isolation, covert operations, and economic embargo. All that is American imperialism has been practiced in Cuba.7

#### Gradual reforms are coming now – Cuba is trying to liberalize its economy but requires threading a delicate ideological needle that is being done now to avoid rocking the domestic political boat – that’s Sweig and Rockefeller

Gradual development now – liberalization, anti-corruption agency, and legalization of markets

Lopez, 2/25 (Arturo, LevyLecturer and Doctoral Candidate, University of Denver “Cuba Under Raul Castro: Economic Reform as Priority?” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/cuba-under-raul-castro_b_2754397.html>)

#### Raul Castro's first presidential term was marked by economic reform and political liberalization. Over the last five years, the government created important institutional foundations for a mixed economy and a less vertical relationship between the state and civil society. Beginning in 2009, a commission to discuss and implement the reforms was created, and through its own initiative, the Council of State instituted an anti-corruption general agency, while restructuring various ministries, in particular, the Super Ministry for Basic Industry in charge of Energy and Mining, and the Sugar Industry. The institutional changes have been accompanied by fiscal, credit and migration reform, a law for cooperatives, as well as the legalization of various markets for consumer goods (real estate, used cars, fast food and restaurants) and services (transportation) directly impacting Cubans' daily lives.¶ The presidential succession from Fidel to Raul Castro has been complemented by an almost completely renovated Council of Ministers and an inter-generational transition in the military command at the level of regional armies and in the party and government at intermediate levels.¶ The Economy as Priority¶ The strategic nature of the economic transition is expressed in the changes in the composition of the labor force. In less than three years between 2010 and 2013, the number of individuals working in small businesses practically tripled, from around 160,000 to 390,000. The liberalization of the licensing process and the amplifying of the production scale on which these businesses operate are significant. Likewise, contracts between state and non-state sectors have been liberalized, opening the possibility for improved productive and administrative synergies between the two, as well as the creation of wholesale markets and credit mechanisms to support the emerging private sector.¶ By the end of 2012, the law of cooperatives was approved, indicating a move away from government control over significant areas of agricultural production, services, small industries and transportation. The legislation included mechanisms to create as well as dissolve such entities, offering a legal framework for their operation within market logic. The law allows for the creation of second degree or cluster cooperatives, a legal mechanism that facilitates amplification of production, the coordination of activities and the establishment of stable relationships between various cooperatives.¶ This shift away from state control is very far removed from an optimal process in economic terms. Instead of maximizing government revenue by selling or renting the assets (taxi cars, restaurants, cafeterias) to the highest bidder, the government has chosen a second best, less disruptive, option: offering the property in usufruct to the same workers who have so far been mismanaging it, with the hope that under the new conditions they will do better. It remains to be seen how emerging institutions will commit to competition and market selection of best practices and administrators, and whether hard budget constraints will be applied in order to allow those who are inefficient under the new conditions to fail.¶ The cooperatives law expressed a compromise between a desire to improve productivity and a political framework biased towards collectivist forms. Property rights in cooperatives are less defined than in small or medium private business. That situation makes an efficient system of contracts and rule of law more relevant than ever, an area in which Cuba is not exactly the epitome of virtue. The experience since the 1990s with the Units of Basic Cooperative Production (UBCP) illustrates that, in the absence of a market framework and the proper legal autonomy, the record for a cooperative is not substantially different than that for a State enterprise, unlike that of the private businesses.¶ The new flexibility of contracts between state-owned companies and the non-state sector favor the expansion of areas (such as transportation) in which private or cooperative ownership has expanded in the last three years. This expansion has already created competitive dynamics allowing good State managers to take advantage of the new conditions, and differentiate themselves from those lacking such adaptive capacities, especially at the local level. The government's discipline regarding the granting of subsidies and non-competitive contracts, controlling corruption, and promoting transparency may contribute to the creation of a labor market for administrators, in which those who are able to manage better receive better salaries.¶ Unfortunately Cuba lacks legal and administrative experience in the preparation and implementation of efficient contracts and this is more difficult to achieve in the short term than simply allowing the expansion of private property. As modern economic theory has shown, in contrast to that what neoliberal ideologues postulate, a better definition of property rights is associated with production increases at the level of small- and medium-sized business. However when corporate structure is more complex, the incomplete nature of contracts between a principal (shareholders, cooperative owners, the government) and its agent (managers) and an environment committed to competition become more fundamental factors.¶ Two notable failures of the reform so far are the lack of a substantial revival of agricultural production, including in the sugarcane industry, and the weak impulse toward export-oriented foreign investment. Even in East Asian countries, with far larger markets than that of Cuba, state promotion of foreign investment was oriented toward the promotion of exports, where competition performs with greater rigor. In the Cuban case, as University of Havana economist Juan Triana has pointed out, the very meager growth is affected by the perverse incentive that many of the foreign enterprises have, even in the midst of full reform, to increase their projections toward the captive national market. In this context, contracts with state enterprises and monopolistic chains of stores, foreign and local corporations extract the maximum rent from a basically unprotected Cuban consumer.

Gradual reforms are real – small businesses, travel, and ownership

Telmundo, 2013 (Carlos Rajo, World/ABC News Partner “Analysis: Castro Brothers’ Successor May inherit a Very Different Cuba” <http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/02/17133513-analysis-castro-brothers-successor-may-inherit-a-very-different-cuba?lite>)

#### Nevertheless, the move marks the beginning of the passing of the torch of power to a new generation.¶ For the first time in half a century, there is the real possibility that a person who did not fight in the Cuban Revolution will lead the country. Diaz-Canel was not even born when Fidel Castro overthrew Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Since then, a Castro has been in power in Cuba: first the now-retired, 86-year-old Fidel, and from 2006 to now, his younger brother, Raul, 81.¶ This generational change does not mean that Cuba will move to a different political system. There is no going back to capitalism, Raul Castro told the National Assembly on Sunday. Nevertheless, the move toward a generational change must be seen in the context of other reforms implemented by the younger Castro.¶ These reforms already are changing the face of Cuban socialism. Castro has introduced private farms, cooperatives in industries and activities outside agriculture, and an array of small business. Granted, these are restricted and heavily regulated, but still they are earning profits and starting to create a segment of wealthier, successful entrepreneurs. Cubans are also now allowed to sell houses and cars, and more recently, to travel abroad if they can get a visa from another country.¶ While little is known of Diaz-Canel’s ideology, it is likely that as the appointed Castro successor he is on board with the reforms.¶ The U.S. State Department reacted tepidly to Castro’s announcement and made clear that it would not be sufficient to prompt a lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Although President Barack Obama doesn’t have election constraints in formulating a Cuba policy in his second term, the issue remains emotionally and politically charged in the U.S., and Congress is not likely to change its mind and lift the embargo while a Castro remains in power.¶ That doesn’t mean relations can’t change, however.¶ For instance, the Obama administration could remove Cuba from the [list of states that sponsor terrorism](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm). Cuba had been on that list since 1982, when it had the financial support of the Soviet Union and could afford to help guerrilla groups in Central and South America.¶ Cuba doesn’t have the resources to help armed groups - or even the political will to do so. Cuba is not Syria, North Korea or Iran in terms of being a threat to the U.S.¶ However, the lifting of the embargo is likely only after a period of more normal relations between the countries. There is also a legal obstacle: According to the [Helms-Burton Act of 1996](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/helms.html), the U.S. will recognize the legitimacy of a Cuban government only when someone other than a Castro is in power. For now, at least, it seems that won’t happen until 2018.¶ Demotions The generational change in Cuba is real. Not only does Diaz-Canel take the place of the 83-year-old Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, but the composition of others organs of power is younger as well. Eighty percent of the members of the National Assembly were born after the revolution, and the average age of members of the Council of State is 57, with about 60 percent having been born post-revolution.¶ As is the tradition in Cuba, Diaz-Canel owes his influential position to one of the Castros -- in this case, Raul. As far back as 2003, the younger Castro talked about the “solid ideological firmness” of the electrical engineer, who also has served as a university professor and party boss in the Cuban provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin. Notably, Diaz-Canel served in the armed forces under Raul Castro and earned a reputation as a good manager of the military’s diverse commercial enterprises.¶ Diaz-Canel will have to be careful. There have been several young leaders who once looked like they had been chosen as a Castro successor but later fell from grace. In every case -- Roberto Robaina, Carlos Lague, Felipe Perez Roque -- they went from being the heir apparent to being suddenly demoted without much ceremony or explanation. The difference is that all were put in their positions of power by Fidel Castro and were demoted when they fell out of favor with him. Diaz-Canel is said to be Raul Castro’s favorite.¶ Assuming that nothing extraordinary happens before 2018, that Raul remains healthy and that there are no ideological purges – “corruption” is the favorite accusation of the Cuban leadership when it comes to making demotions -- the big question for Cuba, and for Diaz-Canel himself, is the success of Raul’s reforms.¶ If they work well, perhaps the regime will develop a sort of hybrid socialism-communism with a dynamic, state-controlled capitalist economy. Or maybe day by day the reforms will penetrate Cuban society and ultimately destroy one the few communist systems left in the world. Diaz-Canel, meanwhile, will start toying with the torch of power.

### 2NC Link Wall

#### The plan overwhelms Cuban internal stability --- multiple links –

#### Anti-Cuban Organizations – American capital influx empowers anti-Cuban political organizations – causes hardliners to adopt a conservative approach that sihfts reforms away from the status quo gradual policies – that’s Hernandez

Communication and people – plan causes media access and revolutionist ideals that loosens Raul’s control

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

#### Relations with the United States are at a historical nadir, but improving them is not a priority, Alarcón said. In fact, Cuba would be challenged to come up with a good strategy if the next U.S. administration were inclined to improve relations. Raúl should carefully weigh whether and to what degree Cuba should seek better relations with the Americans or respond to a new administration’s decision to permit increased travel to Cuba. Although Cuba ultimately stands to gain access to the U.S. market from a normal bilateral relationship, the potential costs in terms of open flows of communication and people could weaken the government’s control over its population. Weaker U.S. sanctions and a more cordial relationship would also make it harder to scapegoat the United States and would shift the onus for economic and political reform to the Cuban leadership. More critical to Cuba than improved relations with the United States is for it to strengthen its relations with the major developing nations, especially Russia, Mexico, and Brazil Speaking for all those present, Machado Ventura thanked Raúl for his confidence in them and assured him of their absolute loyalty. Raúl could be confident because it was highly unlikely that domestic or international conditions would threaten his hold on power, but in any case¶ he should seek to establish his credibility as a leader on his own terms. One way to do so would be to reinforce the fusion of leadership at the highest levels of the Council of State, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Cuban Communist Party. As for the international community, Cuba could count on Venezuelan oil subsidies in the short term, and in the longer term would have access to substantial new energy reserves from offshore oil and gas and the production of sugarcane ethanol. Raúl should concentrate his international efforts on promoting and diversifying Cuba’s economic relationships. Raúl’s greatest challenge will be the rise in expectations for further reforms among the Cuban population, which could be worsened if the new U.S. administration decides to loosen restrictions on travel and remittances. More contact with relatives and friends will result in demands for better jobs and increased freedoms. Remittances are already creating disparities among Cubans with and without access to hard currency.. Since Cuba cannot move quickly or undertake broad reforms, it should attempt to limit expectations Raúl has been skillful in allowing some social reforms; additional reforms, however, should be undertaken cautiously and with the full support of the Party and the armed forces.

That increase in communication and access makes status squo opposition movements effective --- achieves Cuban Instability

Pascaul, 2010 (Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy @ the Brookings Institute “Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>)

#### Participants considered the wide range of actors that constitute the “established opposition” within Cuba today and debated whether these diverse groups could coalesce around a common denominator or vision. Despite the signing of several declarations of unity among leading opposition activists, for the most part the three traditional political fronts— Liberals, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats— being shaped by the most prominent dissident groups continue to pursue their own uncoordinated and often conflicting visions of change. 5 The question of leadership remains a problem, with most opposition groups known for their individual leaders rather than the movements they represent. Such personality-driven activism has had the tendency, many believe, to keep the opposition fractured. Significant efforts have been undertaken to mobilize political opinion, the most well-known being the Varela Project— started in 1998 by Oswaldo Payá of the Christian Liberation Movement and named after Felix Varela, a Cuban religious leader— and its continuation, the Todos Cubanos (All Cubans) program. The Varela Project relied upon Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution of 1976, which provides for citizens to introduce legislation by petition containing at least 10,000 signatures. The principles of the Varela petition, demanding the rights to free expression and association, amnesty for nonviolent political prisoners, free enterprise, and electoral reforms, were seen as the first steps to create the necessary space for all Cubans to be able to freely participate in economic and political life on the island. The petition was an unprecedented example of successful political organizing and was presented to the National Assembly with a total of 25,404 signatures in 2002 and 2003. The Cuban legislature rejected the petition, and the Assembly’s Constitution and Legal Affairs Committee responded with its own counterinitiative: to amend the Cuban constitution to make the socialist nature of the Cuban state permanent. The government claimed that its own petition met with 99 percent voter approval. To further crush the Varela Project and the dissident movement at large, beginning on March 18, 2003, the Cuban government arrested, summarily tried, and jailed seventy-five civil society leaders, including independent journalists, librarians, and trade unionists. In spite of the continued existence of mobilizations such as the Varela Project, participants disagreed in their assessment of the dissident movement’s level of impact within Cuba today. Most agreed that because of the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media and their constant vilification in the state press, few Cubans are likely to recognize the dissident movement as a true symbolic or practical alternative. Some participants felt that international support may be the only thread propping the movement up. Others saw the opposition as a weak but nonetheless substantive movement with significant roots. The key issue confronting participants was whether a dissident-based opposition culture could provide the foundation for an opposition movement, or whether dissident groups in their current form would become less relevant in light of changing political and economic dynamics. In the end, a common concern emerged: with greater economic openings in the offing, more is now at stake for the dissident movement than at perhaps any other moment in its history.

Raul de-legitimization --- moving to the US causes uncertainty amongst elites and demand for rapid reform

Suchlicki, 2012 (Jaime, professor and director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Ignore Raúl Castro’s siren song” <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/01/3025115/ignore-raul-castros-siren-song.html>)

#### Raúl’s legitimacy is based on his closeness to Fidel Castro’s policies of economic centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidel’s legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms.¶ Raúl is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time when the U.S. is seeking regime change in the Middle East, Raúl’s policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.¶

Fear and speculation --- Cubans base their economic reforms off of the consequences of the U.S.S.R. --- fear of economic collapse will cause actions to spin out of control – answers elite

Laverty and Stephens, 2011 (Collin, Center for Democracy in the Americas; Sarah, Executive director of the Center “Cuba’s New Resolve Econmoic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy” <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf>)

#### When the U.S.S.R. collapsed and its former allies underwent rapid economic reforms, Cuba took note of the consequences in Russia and Eastern ¶ Europe—rapid price increases and hyper-inflation, high interest rates, and ¶ wide-scale privatization contributing to corruption, allocation of state assets ¶ to crony capitalists and inadequate institutional transparency. By contrast to ¶ the dismaying economic transition of the Soviet countries, Cuban citizens and ¶ policymakers also observed many successes of gradual, experimental approaches ¶ to economic reforms in Communist Vietnam and China.¶ Cubans are now nervous that, as has occurred in other transitioning ¶ societies, suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek ¶ to increase their influence in political and economic decision-making. “The ¶ government needs to be careful so this thing doesn’t spin out of control,” ¶ worried one academic who spoke with CDA about the lessons of the Soviet ¶ Union and Eastern Europe. “We need to avoid the same mistakes.”¶ Despite public debates and consultations, they reasonably fear key ¶ decisions are being concentrated in a limited number of hands and will be ¶ implemented too quickly.

#### Too much engagement too fast causes instability—going too fast risks civil war

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [\*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### The regime fears fast economic opening as destroying its control

Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona

(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW

For the same reason, the worst possible outcome for Cuba would be the one produced by the opposite pairs of choices, embargo-democracy, as seems unnecessary to discuss. Issues may appear regarding Cuban rulers' second and third preferences. The free trade-democracy outcome would give Cuba the benefits of an open economy, but would fatally undermine the present rulers' control-what they call "independence" or "revolution." Actually, even under the present circumstances, and in spite of their claims against the U.S. embargo, Cuban rulers are wary of allowing more foreign investment, tourism, Cuban-Americans' direct cash remittances, and international communications (including the Internet) because they could enable anti- Castro opinion and pressures among Cuban population.

It thus seems realistic to assume that the present Cuban rulers-in other words, Fidel Castro-value the endurance of the revolutionary dictatorship more than the advantages of open trade and investment. While Cuban rulers may dream of a "Chinese way," with foreign trade and investments permitting them to maintain the dictatorship, they would rather maintain the dictatorship even at the cost of the embargo than risk their own position with a democratic opening. Usual slogans, such as "Revolution or death," clearly illustrate this position. A different ordering will be considered later, basically as a hypothetical preference change induced on Cuban rulers by either the further effects of the embargo or their weakened capability to maintain social control.

#### That will cause a crackdown and civil war

**Iglesias, 12** – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>) **GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban military**

3) Democratic Uprising – A democratic uprising on the island presents a confounding paradox. While it would result in optimal strategic outcomes for the island and the U.S. in the long-term, it also poses the most significant near-term risk to the Cuban people and U.S. national interests.

The road to a “Free Cuba” has several potential paths. The least likely but most dangerous scenario would be a “Cuban Spring” popular uprising. The most likely and least dangerous would be a protracted economic and political evolution across a series of governments concluding in a democratic or quasi-democratic state. Such post-Castro era governments will most likely come from factions of the existing regime.45

Similar to 2011’s events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the broader middle-east, a Cuban Spring could fracture the island’s existing power structure at best and might even15 overthrow the GOC altogether. For that to evolve, several key events would have to develop. The paramount requirement would be an internal security withdrawal from the civic space which would afford dissidents the political maneuver space to solicit and coalesce opposition support. To incentivize and coordinate support, continued liberalization of cellular and internet usage could be leveraged as popular informational linkages. Finally, if a critical civic mass was achieved by dissidents and their supporters, a singularly brutal or compelling event could unleash Cuba’s DNA which historically has endorsed violence to effect political change. At the extreme, the deeprooted hatred and resentments that the Revolution has pressurized over the last half century could erupt in political vendettas, infighting over societal restructuring, and strife over the political process.46

The MININT forces would lead any crackdown. However, if it failed to quell the uprisings, the FAR could be drawn into direct violence against the Cuban people. This would be unprecedented and could have devastating repercussions for the FAR and the regime. If the FAR did act against the people, it would shatter its reputation as the protector of the people; this would be eerily similar to the Egyptian Army’s evolving relations with the Egyptian people. The outcome of a violent upheaval could be tragic for Cubans and threatening to U.S. national interests. Regardless of the outcome, security and stability in post-Castro Cuba would remain at risk if not completely crushed. At the other end of the regime’s risk, time and likelihood spectrums is a slow decay away from Revolutionary socialism. Marxist-Leninist communism’s global bankruptcy has not gone unnoticed by Raúl or the rest of the ruling elite. A transition to “Socialism with a Cuban character” seems likely after Fidel’s death and will put the 16 country on a slippery path to liberalization. As discussed above, economic reforms will likely lead the transition. However, as the “proletariats” dependence on the state is displaced by economic self-reliance, so too will the demands for greater political freedom be disengaged from economic dependence. The benefits to Cuba are many, as they are to American national interests.

### Cred

### 2NC I-P—No War

**No Indo/Pak war—that’s Sawar**

**a) India is worried about its global image and Pakistan knows that it can’t win, pressure from outside powers forces rational reactions by leaders on both sides**

**b) Economic and cultural integration is increasing between the two and focus on internal issues means they don’t have resources to go to war-answers their only 2ac arg of miscalc**

**Prefer our evidence**

**A) Even if they win relations are low now, our evidence is predictive of new foreign investment and most favored nation trading status—makes war not an option**

**B) Structural stabilizing factors** **check war—their evidence is tainted with media bias**

**Mutti 9**— Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. BA in History, Knox College. over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/, AG)

Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes. The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries. 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but against militants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. The international attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to the terrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

**C) Their evidence is fear mongering over past minor skirmishes—it doesn’t assume mutually assured destruction—means they’ll pull back**

**Tepperman ‘9**

Jonathan Tepperman, Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine and former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2009, Newsweek, September 14, 2009, Lexis Academic

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and co-author of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders on each side did what they had to do to avoid it.

**Me Instability won’t escalate—that’s Gauss**

**a) Regional balancing—powers in the region deter aggression-accounts for tf**

**b) Powers will balance aggression and the US can intervene as a last resort to prevent worst-case scenarios-accounts for Russia claim in the 2ac**

**c) Prefer Gause**

**1) He’s a professor of political science**

**2) He cites historical examples—view the middle east debate through empirics rather than recency or specificity**

**Luttwak 7**, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/ (Edward, “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine)

**Why are middle east experts** so **unfailingly wrong**? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is “five minutes to midnight” catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein’s son Abdullah periodically repeating his father’s speech almost verbatim. **What actually happens at each of these “moments of truth**”—and we may be approaching another one—**is nothing much**; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and **always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough**. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

**Look, I’m going to insert a list of every single conflict that has happened in the Middle East—there have been 89 wars—I am going to repeat that. 89 WARS. ZERO have escalated. I really want you to look at it because it just shows how fundamentally ABSURD their scenario is**

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East>

| **Date** | **Conflict** | **Location** | **Casualties** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1902–1932 | [Unification of Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Saudi_Arabia) [[a]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_a) | [Flag of the Second Saudi State.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Second_Saudi_State.svg) [Emirate of Riyadh](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirate_of_Riyadh), [Flag of Hejaz 1917.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Hejaz_1917.svg) [Kingdom of Hejaz](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hejaz), [Standard of the Emir of Kuwait, 1956.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Standard_of_the_Emir_of_Kuwait,_1956.svg) [Kuwaiti](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait) Emirate, [Flag of Nejd (1926).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Nejd_(1926).svg) [Sultanate of Nejd](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Nejd), [Jordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan)[Transjordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transjordan), [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) [Mandatory Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Iraq), [Flag of Nejd (1926).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Nejd_(1926).svg) [Kingdom of Nejd and Hejaz](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Nejd_and_Hejaz) | 8,000-9,000 |
| 1918–1922 | [Simko Shikak revolt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simko_Shikak_revolt)[[3]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-3)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | [Flag of Persia (1910).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Persia_(1910).svg) [Persia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qajar_dynasty) | 1,000-5,500 |
| 1919 | [Egyptian Revolution of 1919](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolution_of_1919)[[4]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-google.com-4) | [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) [Sultanate of Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanate_of_Egypt) | 3,000 |
| 1919–1923 | [Turkish War of Independence](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_War_of_Independence)[[b]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_b)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6e/Flag_of_Greece_%281822-1978%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Greece_%281822-1978%29.svg.png [Greece](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2f/Flag_of_Armenia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Armenia.svg.png [Armenia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenia), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg.png [Soviet Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union) | 170,500-873,000 |
| 1919–2003 | [Iraqi-Kurdish conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi-Kurdish_conflict) [[c]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_c) | [IraqIraqIraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq), [Flag of Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922-1924).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kingdom_of_Kurdistan_(1922-1924).svg) [Kingdom of Kurdistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Kurdistan) | 142,000-320,000 |
| 1920 | [Franco-Syrian War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Syrian_War)[[*citation needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] | [Flag of Kingdom of Syria (1920-03-08 to 1920-07-24).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kingdom_of_Syria_(1920-03-08_to_1920-07-24).svg) [Arab Kingdom of Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Kingdom_of_Syria), [Flag of Syria French mandate.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Syria_French_mandate.svg) [Occupied Enemy Territory Administration](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_Enemy_Territory_Administration) | 5,000 |
| 1920 | [Iraqi revolt against the British](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_revolt_against_the_British)[[5]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-5)[[6]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-6) | [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) [Mandatory Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Iraq) | 2,050-9,000 |
| 1923 | [Adwan Rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adwan_Rebellion) | [Jordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan) [Transjordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transjordan) | 100 |
| 1924–1927 | [Great Syrian Revolt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Syrian_Revolt) (Druze War)[[7]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat6-7)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | [Lebanese French flag.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lebanese_French_flag.svg) [Greater Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Lebanon), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0c/Flag_of_Syria_French_mandate.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria_French_mandate.svg.png[State of Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Syria_(1924%E2%80%931930)), [Flag of Jabal ad-Druze (state).svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Jabal_ad-Druze_(state).svg) [Jabal Druze](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jabal_al-Druze_(state)), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/87/Latakiya-sanjak-Alawite-state-French-colonial-flag.svg/23px-Latakiya-sanjak-Alawite-state-French-colonial-flag.svg.png [Alawite State](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawite_State) | 8,000-12,000 |
| 1925 | [Sheikh Said rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Said_rebellion).[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey) | 15,000-250,500 |
| 1929 | [Palestine riots of 1929](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1929_Palestine_riots)[[9]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-9)[[10]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-10)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg/23px-Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg.png [Mandatory Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine) | 251 |
| 1930 | [Ararat rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ararat_rebellion)[[11]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Cumhur.C4.B1yet.C4.B116-11)[[12]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Kahraman211-12)[[13]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Ayse-13)[[14]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-14)[[15]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-15) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey), [Flag of the Republic of Ararat.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Republic_of_Ararat.svg) [Republic of Ararat](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Ararat) | 4,500-47,000 |
| 1933 | [Simele massacre](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simele_massacre)[[16]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-dtic-16) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c6/Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg.png [Kingdom of Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iraq) | 300 |
| 1934 | [Saudi-Yemeni War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi-Yemeni_War)[[17]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guo-17) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia), [Flag of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Mutawakkilite_Kingdom_of_Yemen.svg) [Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutawakkilite_Kingdom_of_Yemen) | 2,100 |
| 1935 | [Imam Reza shrine rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imam_Reza_shrine_rebellion)[[18]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-18) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg/23px-State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 151 |
| 1935-1936 | [1935–1936 Iraqi Shia revolts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1935%E2%80%931936_Iraqi_Shia_revolts) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c6/Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iraq) | 500 |
| 1935 | [1935 Yazidi revolt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1935_Yazidi_revolt)[[16]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-dtic-16) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c6/Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iraq) | 200 |
| 1936–1939 | [Arab Revolt in Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1936%E2%80%931939_Arab_revolt_in_Palestine)[[19]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-davidcharles-19) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg/23px-Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg.png [Mandatory Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine) | 5,000 |
| 1937 | [Dersim Rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dersim_Rebellion)[[20]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-20)[[21]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-21)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey) | 40,000-70,000 |
| 1939–1945 | [Middle East Theatre of World War II](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East_Theatre_of_World_War_II)[[22]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-22)[[d]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_d)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c6/Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iraq), [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pahlavi_dynasty), [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Egypt), [Lebanese French flag.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lebanese_French_flag.svg) [Greater Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Lebanon), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg/23px-Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg.png [Mandatory Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine), [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Republic_(1930%E2%80%931958)) | 46,000 |
| 1944–1947 | [Jewish insurgency in Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_insurgency_in_Palestine)[[19]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-davidcharles-19)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg/23px-Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg.png [Mandatory Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine) | 1,000 |
| 1946 | [Egyptian Student Riots (1946)](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Egyptian_Student_Riots_(1946)&action=edit&redlink=1)[[23]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-23)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)][[24]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-24) | [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Egypt) | 100-300 |
| 1946 | [Iran crisis of 1946](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_crisis_of_1946)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8)[[e]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_e) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg/23px-State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Flag_of_Kurdistan.svg/23px-Flag_of_Kurdistan.svg.png [Republic of Mahabad](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Kurdistan), [Azerbaijan people's government flag.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Azerbaijan_people's_government_flag.svg) [Azerbaijan People's Government](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azerbaijan_People%27s_Government), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg.png [Soviet Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union) | 2,000 |
| 1947- | [Arab-Israeli conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab-Israeli_conflict)[[f]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_f) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg/23px-Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg.png [Mandatory Palestine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine), [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Egypt), [Flag of Hejaz 1917.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Hejaz_1917.svg) [All-Palestine Government](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Palestine_Government), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a8/Flag_of_Egypt_1952.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt_1952.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/58/Flag_of_United_Arab_Republic.svg/23px-Flag_of_United_Arab_Republic.svg.png [United Arab Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Republic), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d3/Syria-flag_1932-58_1961-63.svg/23px-Syria-flag_1932-58_1961-63.svg.png [Syrian Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c0/Flag_of_Jordan.svg/23px-Flag_of_Jordan.svg.png [Jordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d4/Flag_of_Israel.svg/21px-Flag_of_Israel.svg.png [Israel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Flag_of_Palestine.svg/23px-Flag_of_Palestine.svg.png [Palestinian Authority](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_National_Authority) | 73,000-84,000 |
| 1948 | [Alwaziri coup](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alwaziri_coup)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2) | [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) [Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutawakkilite_Kingdom_of_Yemen) | 4,000-5,000 |
| 1948 | [Al-Wathbah uprising](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Wathbah_uprising)[[*citation needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c6/Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281924%E2%80%931959%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Iraq) | 300-400 |
| 1952 | [Egyptian Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolution_of_1952)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2) | [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Egypt) | 1,000 |
| 1953 | [1953 Iranian coup d'état](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8)[[25]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-25) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg/23px-State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 300-800 |
| 1954–1960 | [Jebel Akhdar War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jebel_Akhdar_War)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8) | [Flag of Muscat.svg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Muscat.svg) Sultanate of [Muscat and Oman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscat_and_Oman) | 100-523 |
| 1955-1963 | [Cypriot intercommunal violence](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypriot_intercommunal_violence)[[19]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-davidcharles-19)[[26]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat7-26) | [Cyprus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus) [Cyprus protectorate](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_history_of_Cyprus) | 400-600 |
| 1956–1960 | [Yemeni-Adenese clan violence](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yemeni-Adenese_clan_violence&action=edit&redlink=1)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b7/Flag_of_the_Colony_of_Aden.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Colony_of_Aden.svg.png [Aden](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colony_of_Aden) | 1,000 |
| 1958 | [1958 Lebanon Crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Lebanon_crisis)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2)[[4]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-google.com-4)[[26]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat7-26) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) | 1,300-4,000 |
| 1958 | [1958 Iraqi Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/14_July_Revolution)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c5/Flag_of_the_Arab_Federation.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Arab_Federation.svg.png [Arab Federation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Federation) | 100 |
| 1959 | [1959 Mosul uprising](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Mosul_uprising)[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warlist-2) | [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) [Iraqi Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Republic) | 2,000-4,000 |
| 1962–1970 | [North Yemen Civil War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Yemen_Civil_War)[[27]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat4-27)[[28]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-28)[[g]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_g) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f6/Flag_of_North_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_North_Yemen.svg.png [North Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_Arab_Republic) | 100,000-200,000 |
| 1962–1975 | [Dhofar Rebellion](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhofar_Rebellion)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/dd/Flag_of_Oman.svg/23px-Flag_of_Oman.svg.png [Oman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oman) | 10,000 |
| 1963 | [White Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Revolution) (Iran)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg/23px-State_Flag_of_Iran_%281925%29.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 100 |
| 1963 | [February 1963 Ba'athist Iraqi coup](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_1963_Iraqi_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)[[29]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-ucairaq-29) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/06/Flag_of_Iraq_%281959-1963%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281959-1963%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 1,000 |
| 1963 | [8th of March Syrian Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8_March_Revolution)[[30]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-30) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/58/Flag_of_United_Arab_Republic.svg/23px-Flag_of_United_Arab_Republic.svg.png [United Arab Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Republic), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 820 |
| 1963–1967 | [Aden Emergency](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aden_Emergency)[[31]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-31) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d7/Flag_of_the_Federation_of_South_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Federation_of_South_Arabia.svg.png [Federation of South Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_South_Arabia), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/db/Flag_of_South_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_South_Yemen.svg.png [South Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Democratic_Republic_of_Yemen) | 2,096 |
| 1963 | [November 1963 Iraqi coup](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_1963_Iraqi_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat) [[32]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-32) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/06/Flag_of_Iraq_%281959-1963%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281959-1963%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 250 |
| 1964 | [1964 Hama riot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Hama_riot)[[33]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Seale.p93-33)[[34]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-34) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 70-100 |
| 1966 | [1966 neo-Ba'athist coup d'état in Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Syrian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 400 |
| 1970–1971 | [Jordan-Palestinian Civil War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_September_in_Jordan)[[26]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat7-26) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c0/Flag_of_Jordan.svg/23px-Flag_of_Jordan.svg.png [Jordan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan) | 2,000-25,000 |
| 1974 | [Turkish invasion of Cyprus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_invasion_of_Cyprus)[[17]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guo-17)[[35]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-35) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d4/Flag_of_Cyprus.svg/23px-Flag_of_Cyprus.svg.png [Cyprus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus) | 1,500-5,000 |
| 1975–1990 | [Lebanese Civil War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Civil_War)[[36]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat3-36)[[h]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_h) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) | 150,000 |
| 1976–1979 | [Political violence in Turkey, 1970s](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_violence_in_Turkey,_1970s)[[37]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Gil-37)[[38]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-38)[[39]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-39) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey) | 5,000-5,388 |
| 1976–1982 | [Islamic uprising in Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_uprising_in_Syria)[[40]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-globalsecurityhama-40) | [SyriaSyria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 40,000 |
| 1979 | [Iranian Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution)[[41]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-Baghi-41)[[42]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-42) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/72/State_Flag_of_Iran_%281964%29.svg/23px-State_Flag_of_Iran_%281964%29.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 3,164-60,000 |
| 1979–1980 | [Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consolidation_of_the_Iranian_Revolution) [[i]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_i) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Flag_of_Iran.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iran.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 10,171 |
| 1979–1983 | [Saudi Eastern Province unrest](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Qatif_Uprising)[[43]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-43) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) | 182-219 |
| 1979 | [Grand Mosque Seizure](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_Seizure)[[44]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-44) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) | 307 |
| 1980 | [1980 Turkish coup d'état](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Turkish_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)[[45]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-45)[[46]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-46) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey) | 127-550 |
| 1980 | [Sadr uprising (1980)](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sadr_uprising_(1980)&action=edit&redlink=1)[[47]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-cline-47) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 1,000-30,000 |
| 1980–1988 | [Iran-Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_war)[[17]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guo-17)[[48]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat2-48)[[j]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_j) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Flag_of_Iran.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iran.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/aa/Flag_of_Kuwait.svg/23px-Flag_of_Kuwait.svg.png [Kuwait](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait) | 1,000,000-1,250,000 |
| 1984–2013 | [Kurdish–Turkish conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish%E2%80%93Turkish_conflict)[[49]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-globalsecuritykurdistan-49)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Flag_of_Turkey.svg/23px-Flag_of_Turkey.svg.png [Turkey](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Flag_of_Kurdistan.svg/23px-Flag_of_Kurdistan.svg.png [Iraqi Kurdistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Kurdistan), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/25/Flag_of_Syria_1972.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria_1972.svg.png [Federation of Arab Republics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Flag_of_Syria.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 30,000-100,000 |
| 1986 | [South Yemen Civil War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen_Civil_War)[[50]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-50) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/db/Flag_of_South_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_South_Yemen.svg.png [South Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Democratic_Republic_of_Yemen) | 5,000-12,000 |
| 1986 | [1986 Egyptian Conscription Riot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Egyptian_Conscription_Riot)[[51]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-The_Middle_East_.26_North_Africa-51) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) | 107 |
| 1986 | [1986 Damascus bombings](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Damascus_bombings)[[*citation needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Flag_of_Syria.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 204 |
| 1987 | [Iranian pilgrim riot (Mecca massacre)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987_Mecca_Massacre)[[52]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-52) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) | 402 |
| 1987-1988 | [ANO Executions](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Nidal_Organization_internal_executions) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Flag_of_Syria.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 170 |
| 1989-1996 | [KDPI insurgency (1989–96)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KDPI_insurgency_(1989%E2%80%9396)) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Flag_of_Iran.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iran.svg.png [Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran) | 1,000 |
| 1990–1991 | [Gulf War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War)[[36]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat3-36) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/04/Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281963-1991%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/aa/Flag_of_Kuwait.svg/23px-Flag_of_Kuwait.svg.png [Kuwait](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) | 40,000-57,000 |
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| 1992–2000 | [Terrorism in Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Egypt)[[54]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-54)[[*page needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citing_sources)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) | 1,300-2,000 |
| 1994 | [1994 civil war in Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_civil_war_in_Yemen)[[*citation needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg.png [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) | 7,000-10,000 |
| 1995– | [Islamic Insurgency in Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Saudi_Arabia)[[*citation needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) | 300 |
| 1998 | [Operation Desert Fox](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Iraq_(December_1998))[[19]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-davidcharles-19)[[26]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-warstat7-26) ([Iraqi No-fly Zones conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Iraqi_No-fly_Zones_conflict&action=edit&redlink=1)) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7b/Flag_of_Iraq_%281991-2004%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281991-2004%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 2,000 |
| 1999 | [1999 Shia uprising in Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Shia_uprising_in_Iraq)[[8]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-narrative-8)[[55]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-fractured-55) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7b/Flag_of_Iraq_%281991-2004%29.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq_%281991-2004%29.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 100-200 |
| 2003–2011 | [Iraq War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War)[[56]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-ap2009apr24-56)[[57]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guardianlogs2-57)[[58]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guardianlogs3-58)[[59]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-guardianlogs-59)[[60]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-aljazeeralogs2-60)[[61]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-iraqbodycountlogs-61)[[k]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#endnote_k) | [IraqIraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 109,032-150,726 |
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| 2004–2010 | [Sa'dah insurgency](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%27dah_insurgency)[[66]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-yemenpost.net-66)[[67]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-67)[[*verification needed*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability)][[68]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-68) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg/23px-Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg.png [Saudi Arabia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg.png [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) | 8,500-25,000 |
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| 2007 | [Nahr al-Bared fighting](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Lebanon_conflict) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) | 480 |
| 2008 | [2008 Lebanon conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Lebanon_conflict) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) | 105 |
| 2009– | [South Yemen Insurgency](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Yemen_Insurgency)[[71]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-71) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg.png [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) | 1,554 |
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| 2010– | [Yemeni al-Qaeda crackdown](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_al-Qaeda_crackdown)[[73]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-73)[[74]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modern_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East#cite_note-74) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg.png [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) | 2,200 |
| 2011 | [2011 Egyptian revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Egyptian_revolution) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) | 846 |
| 2011 | [2011 Yemeni revolution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Yemeni_revolution) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg/23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg.png [Yemen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen) | 2,000 |
| 2011- | [Syrian civil war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Flag_of_Syria.svg/23px-Flag_of_Syria.svg.png [Syria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria) | 94,000+ |
| 2011- | [Sinai insurgency](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinai_insurgency) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) | 118-126 |
| 2011- | [Iraqi insurgency (post-U.S. withdrawal)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_insurgency_(post-U.S._withdrawal)) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f6/Flag_of_Iraq.svg/23px-Flag_of_Iraq.svg.png [Iraq](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) | 3,000-6,600 |
| 2011- | [Lebanese Alawite-Sunni conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_conflict_in_Lebanon) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg/23px-Flag_of_Lebanon.svg.png [Lebanon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon) | 158+ |
| 2013- | [2013 Egyptian coup d'état](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Egyptian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat) | http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/23px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png [Egypt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt) | 90 |

**d) Regional suicide—the Middle East is too close together**

**Seng ’98** Jordan (University of Chicago) June, 1998 “Strategy for Pandora’s Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States” online, CMR

The Middle Eastern nuclear scenario is the quintessential example of how fallout fears can limit nuclear use. Israeli territory is less than three hundred miles long and less than 80 miles across at its widest. At less than 13,000 square miles, it is smaller than all but a few U.S. states. The radioactive fallout from even one medium size nuclear detonation could conceivably contaminate the entirety of Israeli territory. Any nuclear detonations near Israeli borders pose the same threat. Detonations in the territories of Syria, Jordan, northern Egypt, western Iraq, and northern Saudi Arabia would almost certainly send radioactive fallout into Israeli territory. Detonations in the farther reaches of Arab territory might well send fallout into Israel unless the winds were kind and pushed radioactive debris away quickly. The degree to which prevailing winds might offer relief from fallout depends on which country Israel attacked with its weapons. Israel is almost entirely surrounded by hostile states, so if Israel attacked more than one Arab country simultaneously, fallout would drift in from one direction or another no matter which way the winds blew. Because most of the terrain in the Middle East is flat desert, there are few natural barriers to offer protection from the floating debris. Another complicating factor is that Israel, like its neighbors relies heavily on river water for its crops and potable water systems, meaning that a contamination in an upriver portion of the country could have great repercussions downstream. Numerous analysts have noted that fallout fears will probably prevent Israeli leaders from ever staging a nuclear test detonation on its own territory, and this may explain why Israel allegedly conducted a test explosion off the coast of South Africa in l979. The devastation that could come from even a relatively small release of radioactive debris in Israeli territory also makes the Dimona reactor an especially inviting target for Israel’s hostile neighbors (Nasser reportedly sent Egyptian bombers near Dimona at the start of the 1967 hostilities in order to intimidate Israel with its destructive potential).

# 2NR China DA

#### US engagement manufactures conflict which causes China to withdraw

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The Chinese leap forward into Latin America has occurred in the context of the lowest point of US-Latin American relations since the end of the Cold War. While it is true that the US has tended to stop looking southwards since 9/11, Latin America is still in Washington’s zone of influence. This is a powerful reason for China to be cautious in its move to the region. As Gonzalo Paz says, ‘China doesn’t want to change the strategic paradigm in the region and doesn’t want to be seen as a threat to the US.’